Politics // May the President wiretap a warrant to protect national security?
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May the President wiretap a warrant to protect national security?
The United States Constitution gives the President the power to protect the national security. Under Art. II, Sec. 1 of U.S. Constitution provides that “the Executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.” The current issue at hand is whether the President may wiretap a warrant to protect the country from attack of enemies. This involves the ethical and legal considerations of the permeation movement of the government to the outside borders through wiretapping (Mullikin & Rahman 33).
President Obama puts security policy goals in pursuance to Afghanistan as the highest foreign policy priority. Obama shaped his policies in reaction to his predecessors and focused on “adding 21,000 more troops, committed billions of dollars to restore Afghan security forces and speed up economic development and set hundreds of civilian experts to help rebuild the country (Rashid 4).” Overall, the President wanted to pursue worldwide alliance and involve bordering countries in a regional policy resolution. However, though the purpose of the strategy is coherent with the existing problem, Rashid noted that these assertions could possibly be done but neither the time nor the resources to employ it because it is lacking in Obama administration. In fact, even the action of preparing for the Afghan election to ensure security for Afghanistan is being questioned. Obama faced complicating issues between the relationship of US and President Hamid Karzai due to allege ‘substitution.’ Karzai suspected that Obama and Holbrooke wanted to replace with him and seize the elections under a concierge president assigned by the US. This allegation has made to worsen the gravity of situation (Rashid 5).
The two-major-theater-war principle at any rate had the virtue of speaking to threats to imperative U.S. allies and other interests. However, as the decade showed off on, it was ever more evident that while significant interests were at issue in both major theaters, in neither was U.S. continued safe existence in question. As Carter stressed it, the A-list seemed unfilled, “so policy and strategy focused on B- and C-level problems instead (17).” Contrary to the report of National Commission on Terrorist Attacks (NCTA) that even prior to 9/11, U.S. had strategy to combat global terrorism that is by isolating and applying pressure on states that sponsor or acquiesce to terrorists on their territory. But it was of no ground, considering that counterterrorism was strengthened and highlighted merely after the 9/11 attacks. The great efforts of counterterrorism were perceptible and largely unsuccessful until the 9/11 attacks caused many governments to alter their approach and collaborate more expansively with the United States in the struggle against terrorism. Considering this, Obama approached the conflict by realistic policy of purging the tools of mass destruction. Given that nuclear weapons are the major strength that Afghanistan extremists used in destroying and spreading terrorism, Obama’s goal extend to pursue to other allied nations. As he emphasized that the security asked by nations who wanted it can never be answered in the spread of nuclear weapons but on rejection and stoppage through total destruction of destructive weapons.
The emphasis of drawing strengths from the allied forces through diplomacy by forging new partnerships and giving aid to them provides substantial machinery to extend the boundaries of support of crashing the terrorism in Afghanistan. As he aimed to reinstate the mutual partnerships and interconnection between US and Muslim world is indeed a struggle against violent extremism, and involve not only the stand-up for American’s security but also for win-win strength for states who asked to prevent conflict. Significantly, more than any other nation, the United States has underwritten the global security. The leadership to momentous challenges that poison the national and global discourse is really a must to develop the economic stability and rebuild the gap security problems. As such, Obama’s liberal internationalism that rejects the War of Terror is real policy goals that promise to pursue in Afghanistan. Although given in the preceding assertion that US neither have time nor the resources to pursue Obama’s foreign policy goals, the revolutionary vision of international system transformed this backdrop (Keller 3) and significantly be the way to fill-up what may be nothing or deficient to US policy.
The diplomatic co-existence of India and Pakistan has been damaged ever since their independence unsettled to dispute over the previous princely state of Kashmir. Pakistan, declining the uncertain concurrence of the State with India, directs 1/3rd of Kashmir, while the other continues in Indian authority (Lian 80). As the dispute-resolution strategic efforts at bilateral linkages and UN level have botched largely due to India’s inflexibility. The dispute has by now directed both the countries to several arm-conflicts and across-the-board armed forces accelerations, relating death-defying nuclear brinkmanship. Recently, the implication of premature declaration of the dispute has boosted in consideration of its possibility as a nuclear flashpoint, repercussions on the US – direct ISAF movement in Afghanistan, relation with human rights exploitations in Kashmir along with the subsequent response in the structure of aggressive and dreadful insolvency of South Asia (Lian 92). Significantly, the lack information has driven by political will and determined resolution, mutual trust – discrepancy and intensely unshakable positions are the major obstruction and impacts in the way of dispute-resolution.
In this sense, the Executive power to call for warrantless wiretapping movement could be done but the preeminent security policy on War on terrorism within and out the United States has sought to seriously jeopardize not only the security and other significant aspects of the state. The development of a threat/risk policy based solely on the reduction of risk because terrorists processed substances that may tune-up the toxins that terrorists deploy (Innocent 2). As it was considered due to the long-standing accomplishment of this nuclear-armed Muslim-majority country relied significantly on the public’s renouncing of extremism, and that the continued presence in other nation is counting further stimulation to radicalism that must stop embracing as policy.
Works Cited
Carter, Ashton B. The architecture of government in the face of terrorism. International Security, (2002): 17-36. Retrieved at MIT Press Database.
Keller, Patrick. Barack Obama’s foreign policy what can NATO expect from the next U.S. President? Research Paper 43 (November 2008): 1-8.
Lian, Wang. Talibanization in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan. Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) 4.1 (2010): 74-100.
Mullikin, Arwen & Rahman, Syed. The Ethical Dilemma of the USA Government Wiretapping. International Journal of Managing Information Technology (IJMIT), 2(4): 32-40
Rashid, Ahmed. The Afghanistan Impasse. New York Review of Books 56.15 2009: 1-9.
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